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THE  OVERALL  CHALLENGE Economic  gains  from  the  1992  programme  could rise to 
200 billion ECU  or more,  together with 
a  substantial  boost  to employment. 
The  Commission  today  revealed  the  results of  a  major  study which 
It  commissioned  to evaluate sclentlflcal ly  the benefits of  the 
~Ingle market.  This  study which  wl  I I  shortly  be  publ lshed  In  book 
form  provides  the  hard  evidence,  the confirmation of  what  those 
who  are engaged  In  bul ldlng  Europe  have  always  known:  that  the 
failure to achieve  a  single market  has  been  costing  European 
Industry dearly  In  unnecessary costs  and  lost opportunities;  that 
the completion of  the  Internal  market  will  provide  the  economic 
context  for  the  regeneration of  European  Industry  In  both  goods 
and  services;  and  that  It wl  I I  give  a  permanent  boost  to the 
prosperity of  the people of  Europe. 
The  study  not  only quantifies  the  heavy  cost  that we  now  pay 
because of  the many  barriers which  frag~ent the  Community's 
economy  Into  twelve  separate markets;  It  also calculates the 
value of  the  Immense  opportunities which  the completion  of  the 
Internal  market  wl I I  open  up:  opportunities  for  growth,  for  Job 
creation,  for  economies  of  scale,  for  Improved  productivity  and 
profltabl I tty,  for  healthier competition,  for  profe~slonal  and 
business mobl I lty,  for  stable prices  and  for  consumer  choice. 
The  total  potential  economic  gain  to the Community  as  a  whole  Is 
e~tlmated to  be  In  the  region of  ECU  200 billion or  more 
expressed  In  1988  prices.  This would  add  about  5%  to the 
Community's  gross  domestic  product.  This calculation  Includes  not 
only  the  savings made  by  removing  the barriers which  directly 
affect  lntra-EC  trade  (essentially  frontier  formal I ties and 
related delays)  but  also,  and  more  significantly stl II,  the 
effects of  removing  barriers which  hinder  new  market  entrants  and 
thus  the  free  play of  competition.  To  that  we.must  add  the cost 
savings which  businesses can  achieve  through  exploiting more 
fully  the  potential  economies  of  scale which  a  single market 
offers.  These  gains wll I  already start  to arise  In  the short-run, 
as  Increases  In  productional low  fixed  Investment  costs  to be 
covered  by  larger  sales volumes.  To  a  much  more  Important  extent, 
however, - 2  -
they  wl I I  accrue  In  the  longer  run  as  companies  and  production 
units are  restructured  and  get closer  to  the most  efficient 
possible scales of  production.  Finally,  the estimate  Includes 
other  gains  In  efficiency due  to  Intensified pressures of 
competition affecting administrative overhead costs  and  over-
manning  at  alI  levels. 
The  study  further  shows  that  the  predicted effects of  EC  marl<et 
Integration  through  removal  of  customs  barriers,  opening  up 
publ lc  procurement,  I lberal lsatlon of  financial  services,  and 
other  supply-side effects wl 11  In  the medium-term 
In  addition  to  boosting output,  employment  and  I lvlng 
standards  simultaneously  cool  the  economy,  deflating 
consumer  prices  by  an  average of  6%; 
relax  budgetary  and  external  constraints,  Improving  the 
balance of  publ lc  finances  by  an  average  equivalent  to  2.2% 
of  GOP  and  boosting  the  EC's  external  position  by  around  1% 
of  GOP. 
(1)  The  ntudy. 
In  1986  Lord Cockfield,  on  behalf  of  the Commission,  Invited 
Mr  Cecchini  to organise  n  comprehensive  enquiry  Into  the  likely 
economic  Impact  of  completing  the  programme  of  actions set out  In 
the  1985 White  Paper  on  the  Internal  market. 
A  larger  number  of  Independent  economic  experts,  consultants  and 
research  Institutes contributed  to  the proJect,  fully  supported 
also  by  the services of  the Commission. 
The  methods  of  work  Included: 
studies of  Individual  categories of market  barriers  (e.g. 
frontier  delays); 
studies of  how  Individual  manufacturing  Industries are 
affected  (e.g.  food-processing,  pharmaceuticals, 
automobl les,  telecommunications  equipment  ...  ); 
studies of  how  Individual  service sectors nrc affected 
(e.g.  financial  and  business services, 
telecommunications ...  ); 
studies of  the main  economic  phenomena  that are relevant 
(e.g.  economics  of  scale,  structure of  Industries,  the 
Incidence of  competition on  corporate behaviour ..•  ) 
a  survey of  the opinion of  11,000  Industrialists,  covering 
nil  countries  and  branches of  Industry; 
econometric modelling work  for  Integrating  the results of 
the mlcrocconomlc data  Into overall  macroeconomic  results. - 3  -
The  results of  the  study wl  I I  be  set out  In  a  book  ~Y Mr  Paolo 
Cecchini  and  his col leagues.  This  book  wl I I  appear  In  all 
Community  languages,  and  wl  I I  be distributed  by  private 
publ lshers  In  the Member  States.  The  first editions wl  II  begin  to 
become  aval table  In  one month's  time.  Details of  the underlying 
economic  analysis wl  I I  be  made  available  In  a  special  number  of 
"European  Economy"  by  the  Directorate-General  of  Economic  and 
Financial  Affairs of  the Commission,  also  to be  published  In  a 
month's  time. 
In  addition,  three volumes  of  working  papers,  to be  pub! lshed  by 
the commission,  wl  11  set out  the  summary  findings  of  the  numerous 
sectoral  studies  nnd  business  surveys.  Finally,  the complete 
reports  of  the main  consultants'  studies wl I I  also be  published 
as  documents  by  the Commission. 
(2)  The  results 
n)  Mlcroeconomlc estimates 
The  direct costs of  frontier  formal ltles,  and  associated 
administrative costs  for  the private and  public  sector  are 
estimated  to  be  of  the order  of  1.8% of  the  value of  goods  traded 
within  the Community.  To  this must  be  added  the costs  for 
Industry  of  other  Identifiable barriers  In  the  Internal  market, 
such  as  technical  regulations  and  other  barriers,  which  are 
estimated,  In  opinion  surveys  of  Industrial lsts,  to average  a 
I lttle under  2%  of  those companies'  tot~l  costs.  The  combined 
total  then  represents  about  3  1/2% of  Industrial  value-added. 
These  figures  reflect  the direct cost  of  Identifiable market 
barriers.  The  total  gains  that  are  to  be  expected  from 
competitive  Integration of  the  product  mnrkots  are much  greater. 
In  particular,  Industries  and  service sector  branches,  at  present 
subject  to market  entry  restrictions,  could  experience 
considerably  bigger  percentage cost  and  price  reductions. 
Examples  Include  branches  of  Industry  for  which  government 
procurement  Is  Important  (energy  generating,  transport,  office 
and  defence  equipment),  financial  services  (banking,  Insurance 
and  securities)  and  road  and  air  transport.  In  these cases cost 
and  price reductions often of  the order  of  10  to  20%,  and  even 
more  In  some  cases,  are expected. - 4  -
The  ~tudy show~ that  there are substantial  unexplolted  potential 
economic~ of  scale  In  European  Industry.  In  more  than  half  of  alI 
branches of  Industry,  20  firms  of  efficient size can co-exist  In 
the  commun 1 ty market  whereas  the  I argest  nat I ona I  marl<ets  cou I d 
only  have  4  each.  As  a  result,  only  an  Internal  market  on  a  truly 
European  scale  can  combine  the advantages  of  technical  and 
economic  efficiency,  20  Community-wide  operating  firms  being more 
1 lkely  to assure effective competition  than  4  firms  In  a  domestic 
national  market.  Comparing  the present  Industrial  structure with 
a  more  rational lsed  but  stl I I  less  than  optimal  one,  It  Is 
estimated  that  about  one  third of  European  Industry  could profit 
from  cost  reductions  of  ranging  from  1  to  7%,  depending  on  the 
branch  concerned.  The  aggregate cost  saving  from  Improved 
economies  of  scale would  amount  to  something  In  the  order  of  2% 
of  GOP.  There  are other  gains  In  efficiency due  to  Intensified 
pressures of  competition.  These  gnlns may,  for  example,  concern 
overhead costs,  over-manning  and  Inefficient management  of 
Inventories.  Evidence  from  a  variety of  sources  suggests  that 
these  kinds of  efficiency gains  can  be  of  considerable 
Importance.  In  addition,  where monopoly  profits exist as  a 
result of  market  protection,  they  wl I I  be  reduced or·el lmlnated, 
and  thus offer  gains  for  consumers  through  price  reductions. 
Indeed,  whl lea significant part  of  these consumer  price 
differences  between  countries  Is  accounted  for  by  Indirect 
taxation  and  excises much  of  the  remainder  Is  Indicative of 
Inefficiency and.non-competltlve market  segmentation. 
In  the aggregate,  for  nil  sectors nnd  nil  types of cost-saving 
and  potential  price reductions,  tho  stud¥ suggests  total  economic 
gains of  tho order of  4  1/4~ to G  1/2~ of  GOP  for  the Community 
as  a  r1ho I e.  At  1980  pr I ccs,  for  tho  twc I vc Member  States,  thIs 
amounts ton range of  around  170  to 250 billion ECU.  (The  200 
bll I lon  ECU  quoted  above  Is  a  rounded mid-point  In  this range). 
The  study did  not  systematically estimate  the distribution of 
these gains  by  Member  States.  However,  the evidence  Is  that all 
stand  to gain.  Since many  of  the potential  benefits arise  from 
lower  achieving costs  nnd  more  efficient  productions methods,  the 
newer  Member  States could  register above  average  gains, 
especially  If  account  Is  also  taken of  the decision  to double  the 
Community's  structural  funds. 
b)  Ma.croeconom I c  s  lmu IntI  ons 
The  study also  Includes  a  series of  macroeconomic  simulation 
exercises whose  purpose was  to give  some  Idea  of  the possible 
tlme-profl le of  the  Impact  of  the  1992  programme,  and  also 
express  the results  In  terms  of  other  economic  variables such as 
employment  and  Inflation.  For  this purpose,  the effects of  the 
Internal  market  programme  (obtained  from  the  foregoing 
mlcroeconomlc  es.tlmates)  were  grouped  under  four  major  headings, 
each  having  a  different  type of macroeconomic  Impact: - 5  -
(a)  the  removal  of  frontier  delays  and  costs, 
(b)  the opening  of  public markets  to competition, 
(c)  the  1 lberal lsatlon  and  Integration of  financial  markets, 
and 
(d)  more  general  supply-side effects,  reflecting changes  In  the 
strategic behaviour  of  enterprises  In  a  new  competitive 
environment. 
The  results are  In  part dependent  on  the macroeconomic  pol Icy 
accompanying  the  1992  programme.  The  results  show  that  the  first 
and  Immediate effects wl  I I  be  In  terms  of  downward  pressure on 
prices  and  costs.  Increases  In  output  would  follow with  a  modest 
time-lag.  After  about  5  to  6  years,  a  cumulative  Impact  of 
+  41/2%  In  terms  of  GOP  and  - 6%  In  terms  of  the price  level 
could  be  expected.  The  positive  Impact  on  employment  could  In  the 
medium-term  amount  to  about  2  ml  I I Ions  Jobs,  even  after  absorbing 
the significant productivity  and  restructuring effects, 
attributable to  the  Integration of  the market. 
If a  specific macroeconomic  policy that  recognized  tho potential 
for  faster  growth  Is pursued;  as would  be  reasonable to expect 
also  In  view of  the  lessening of  Inflation,  balance· of  payment 
and  budget deficit constraints,  the gains could mount  to 7%  In 
terms of  GOP  and  a  5  million  Increase  In  employment. 
c)  Ihe ovetnl I  rcsultn 
The  results of  the  two  sets of  calculat.lons,  mlcroeconomlc  and 
macroeconomic,  are  thus mutually  supporting.  The  range  of 
figures  may  wei I  be  an  underestimate  since  they  excludes certain 
types  of  dynamic  continuing benefits  that market  Integration  Is 
I lkely  to confer,  which  are  thought  to be  Important  but  which  are 
very difficult  to quantify. 
Three  examples: 
Firstly,  there  Is  Increasing  evidence  that  the  trend  rate 
of  technological  Innovation  In  the  economy  depends  upon  whothcr 
or  not  there  ls·competltlon;  only  an  Integrated market  of 
European  dimensions  can  offer  the benefits both  of  scale of 
operation  and  of  competition. 
Secondly,  there  Is  evidence  In  fast-growing  high  technology 
Industries of  dynamic  or  learning  economies  of  scale,  whereby 
costs  decl lne  as  the  total  accumulated  production of  certain 
goods  and  servl~es  Increase;  market  segmentation  gravely  1 lmlts 
the  scope  for  these  benefit~ and  damages  performance  In  key  high-
growth  Industries. 
Thirdly,  the  business strategies of  European  enterprises 
are  bound  to change:  Indeed,  there  Is  evidence of  thl~ already 
happening.  A  ful I  Integration of  the  Internal  market  wl  I I  foster 
the  emergence  of  truly  European  companies,  with  structures  and 
strategies that  are better  suited  to securing  a  strong  place  In 
world markets. - 6  -
The  ~tudy further  makes  the  point  though  that  the  benefits of  the 
single market  wl I I  develop  gradually,  they  wl I I  multiply  a~ they 
grow.  In  the  first  phase  the  removal  of  barriers wl I I  produce 
narrow,  technical  and  short  term  gains  but  a~ market  Integration 
wl I I  begin  to  Impact  on  structure~.  the benefits  wl I I  become  much 
bigger. 
(3)  Real lzlng  the  full  ootcntlal  g~ 
The  study confirms  that  If  Europe  Is  to  get  the most  out  of  Its 
large  home  market  the  Internal  frontiers must  truly disappear  and 
be  free of  administrative complications  between  Member  states. 
AI  I  barriers  have  to  be  removed,  otherwise  the  last  remaining 
barriers may  on  their  own  be  sufficient  to  keep  the markets 
~egmented and  to  smother  competition. 
The  chat lenge  Is  pol I tical  and  social  n~ wei I  a~ economic.  To 
succeed  the  programme  requires changes  which  wl I I  affect 
protected  positions:  those of  region~ as  wei I  as  nations  of 
companle~ and  Industries  and  of  their workforce.  The  road  to 
market  Integration,  however  pnvcd  with  good  Intentions,  lends  to 
1992  by  way  of  hard  decl~lons rather  than  easy  option~.  The~e 
wl I I  be  made  easier  under  the  following  circumstances: 
Business must  respond  to  the chat lenge  and  seize the  new 
opportunities  on  offer.  Corporate management  should  nlso  seek  to 
make  Industrial  relations  less confl lctunl,  encourage  employee 
Involvement  In  the  I lfe of  the enterprise.  nnd  ensure  that 
workers  share  In  the  Jointly achieved  productivity gains. 
Competition  policY must  be  effectively enforced  by  both 
Community  and  national  ndmlnl~trntlon~.  to  guarantee  thnt  the 
barriers which  have  just  been  removed  nrc  not  replaced  by  other 
anti-competitive  device~.  Those  who  wish  to compete  must  be 
certain  thnt  they  wl I I  be  allowed  to  do  ~o.  Firms  should  be  able 
to compete  fn I r  I y  wIth  lmown  commerc In I  r Iva Is,  but  they  cannot 
be  expected  to compete with  governments  standing  behind  these 
rival~.  Equally  the  business world  must  understand  clearly  that 
commercial  practices which  tend  to protect markets,  or  lend  to 
the abuse of  dominant  positions,  must  be  vigorously countered.  At 
present,  price discrimination  between  national  markets  Is 
widespread  and  substantial,  to  the considerable detriment  of 
consumers.  Competition  policy must,  for  the market  to  be  fully 
Integrated,  ensure,  for  example,  that  para I lei  Imports  nrc  to  be 
welcomed  wherever  undue  price differences  are. seen  to culst. 
The distribution of  gnlns must  be  fair,  ns  must  be  the 
distribution of  the costs.  It  should  not  be  taken  for  granted 
that  the distributional  Impact  wll I  be  excessively  problematic. 
Experience  for  example with  the  removal  of  lntrn-EC. tariff 
barriers  Indicated only  n  modest  redistributive effect.  The 
accesnlon of  new  members  has  confirmed  the potential  for  the 
stimulation of  Investment  and  economic  growth.  Undoubtedly 
however  assistance will  be  needed  for  the Community's 
disadvantaged  nnd  declining  regions  and  labour  affected  by 
restructurIng.  So  I ong  as  the potent I a I  gn Ins  from  marlcct 
Integration nrc used  to  reinforce conscns  around  the  1992 
programme,  tts success can  be assured. - 7  -
Economic  policy must  be  supportive.  The  survey  undertaken 
for  the  study  revealed  that  business opinion was  optimistic  that 
the  1992  programme  Is  expected  to  result  In  Increased  sales and 
output.  These  favourable  expectations wl  I I  need  to be  backed  by 
a  wei I  co-ordinated,  growth-orientated macroeconomic  pol Icy. 
Monetary  policy must  continue  to 
stabl I lty within  Europe.  Removing  the 
markets  and  fully  I lberal Ising capital 
the  risk of  exchange  rate  lnstabl I lty. 
Increased monetary  policy co-operation 
EMS. 
(4)  The  main  conclusion. 
promote  a  zone of 
barriers  between  financial 
movements  wl  I I  Increase 
This  must  be  countered  by 
through  a  strengthened 
Today's  fragmentation  of  the  European  economy  and  Its weak 
competitiveness  In  many  markets  means  that  there  Is  large 
potential  for  the  rational lsatlon of  production  and  dl~trlbutlon 
structures,  leading  to  Improvement~  In  productivity,  and 
reductions  In  costs  and  prices.  The  completion  of  the  Internal 
market  wl  I I,  If  appropriately  reinforced  by  the competition 
pol lcles of  both  the Community  and  Member  States,  have  a 
significant  and  positive  Impact  on  economic  performance  and 
employment.  The  size of  this  Impact,  In  terms  of  the potential 
for  Increased  non-Inflationary growth- an  economic  bonus  of 
ECU  200  bl I I lon  at  1908  prices  and  the creation of  ml  I I Ions  of 
new  Jobs  - should  be sufficient  to  transform  the Community's 
economic  performance  from  a  less  than  brl II lant  one  to  an 
outstanding  one.  · q 
Annexe 
Note  on  Tnblea 
The  two  tobleo  aummorioc,  respectively,  the  microeconordc  and 
macroeconomic  estimateo of  the  impact  of  completing  the  internal market. 
Two  acta  of  calculations  were  undertaken  because  the  microeconomic 
method  permits  the  reoulto  to  be  aaaembled  according  to  different 
microeconomic  concepto  and  in conoiderable  pectoral detail,  whcrcno  the 
macroeconomic  method  ollowo  the  aggregate  rcoulto  to  be  expressed  in 
termo  of  more  macroeconomic  voriableo  (GOP,  inflation,  employment 
etc.).  The  two  octo of  calculationo arc  booed  on  the  oome  basic occtornl 
information,  and  are  therefore  conoiatent.  However  the  final  rcoulto 
offer  oomewhnt  different  rnngco  for  each  of  the  two  methodo  oincc  they 
explore  variouo  hypotheoeo  of  different  k1ndo  (of  o  policy  or 
methodological character). 1 • 
z. 
Table  1 
Ulcroecononic cot.lnntco of  potential cconoruc .;nino for  the EC 
rcoultlnr. froo  c~plctlon of  the intcronl cnrket 
Billiono  % of 
ECU  GDP 
G3ins  from  removal  of  bnrriero 
affecting trade  0-9  0.2-0.J 
Gains  from  removal  of  barriero 
affecting overall  production  57-71  2.0-2.4 
-----
3.  Gains  from  removing  bnrricro 
(sub-total)  65-80  2·2-2.7 
----
4.  Gnlno  from  exploiting cconomicn 
of  scale  more  fully  61  2-1 
s.  Gains  from  intensified competition 
reducing  business  ineffectivcneno 
and  aonopoly  profito  '•6  1.6 
·----
6.  Gains  from  market  integration 
(sub-total)  62*-107  2·1"-3·7 
7.  Total  Gains 
- for  7  Member  States at  1985  priceo  127-187  4  1/4 - 6  1/2 
- for  12  Member  States at  1988  priceo  170-250  4  1/4  - 6  1/2 
Source:  Commission  of  the  EC. 
liLT.  FIGURP:S  EXCEPT  In TilE  LAST  J.INE  ARE  EXPRESSED  AT  198.5  Pnl~S Aim 
REl.ATE  TO  7  tiEHnEn  STATES.  TIIF.  AGGREGATE  rtESUl.T  IS  SCALED  UP  In TnmtS 
OF  THE  12  rtEliDEn  STATJ'ItS'  1900  GDl'  OllLY  Ill nm LAST  Lltm. 
The  ranges  for  certain  linen  repreoent  the  resulto  of  ueinr; 
alternative  oourceo  of  information  and  mcthodologico.  The  ccvcn 
Member  Stnteo  (Germany,  France,  Italy,  United  Kingdom,  Benelux) 
account  for  88%  of  the  GDP  of  the  EC  twelve.  Extrapolation  of  the 
results  in  termo  of  the  onme  ohnre  of  GDP  for  the  eeven ·and  twelve 
Member  Stnteo  io  not  likely  to  over-estimate  the  total  for  the 
twelve.  The  detailed  figureo  in  the  table  relate  only  to  the  oeven 
Hember  Staten  because  the  underlying  otudie6  mainly  covered  thooc 
countries. 
*This  alternative estimate  for  the  sum  of  line 6  cannot  be  broken  doun 
between  the  tuo  lines  4  and  5. nature  of 
economic 
policy 
lUthout 
occompnnying 
econoctic 
policy 
aeooureo 
Uith 
occoapany-
ing 
economic 
policy 
ceanuren 
Table  2 
ltacroeconomic  conoequence~ of  EC  mnrket intcnrnt1on 
accoapnnied  by  economlc  policy acnouren 
Economic  conoequencco 
GOP  Conoumer  Employ- Public 
no  priceo  ment  (ln  deficit no 
%  no  rnUliono)  % point of 
%  GOP 
4.5  -6.1  1-8  2.2 
-4.5  s.o 
Margin of error:  ~ 30% 
External 
balance no 
% point of 
GOP 
1.o 
-0.2 
Source:  Commiooion  of  EC.  Simulationo  conducted  on  the  IIErutES  ond  l!tTEnLIUK 
econo1:1ic  rnodelo. 
trote:  The  economic  conoequenceo  of  the  mngnitudeo  indicated  nrc  coticntcd 
to accumulate over  a  medium-terl:l  period. 
The  accompanying  economic  policy  meaourco  (lncrenoed  public 
inveotment,  in·come  tnx  reductlono)  nrc  calibrated  oo  that  the  room 
for  manoeuvre  created  by  internal  market  integration  for  the  budg~t 
balance  or  external  balance  ore  largely  uoed  (i.e.  thene  voriobleo 
return clone  to their initinl oituotion). 